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20ABSTRACT This study aims to provide empirical evidences about the influence
of
fiscal decentralization on the level of corruption in regional governments of district and city in Indonesia and
the role of natural resources in that influence. Panel data is used in this study with the observation period
from 2008 to 2014 and 514 population from regency and city governments. As many as 433 observations
from the final sample was taken based on the purposive sampling method. meanwhile, the hypothesis
testing using partial least squares (PLS) structural equation modeling with WarpPLS. The results of the
study found out that fiscal decentralization
27will increase the incidence of corruption in the district and city of
regional governments. The second finding is that natural resources
27will increase the incidence of corruption when the
regional autonomy system and fiscal decentralization are applied to local governments. Keywords: Fiscal
Decentralization, Corruption, Natural Resources JEL Classifications: E62, Q34 1. INTRODUCTION The
regional autonomy and fiscal decentralization have legally begun since the issuance of
15Law No. 22 of 1999 concerning Regional Government and Law No. 25 of
1999 concerning Financial Balance between the Central and Regional
Governments
(Kuncoro, 2014). Those two laws have so far undergone several changes. Regional governments of district
and City have become the appropriate level where the delegation of power and resources will be submitted.
The power, authority and responsibilities of the District and City governments are substantive and extensive,
and the decentralization policy will be very radical, the big bang reforms occurred in the governance
structure (Ma and Hofman, 2000). Rondinelli (1998) stated that the purpose of decentralization is to improve
the abilities of regional government in providing public good
28and services, to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of economic
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establishment within the region. According to Law No. 22 of 1999, the decentralization is expected to be
able to improve the services and welfare for better society, the development of democratic life, justice, and
equality, and the maintenance of harmonious relations between the central and regional as well as between
regions in order to maintain the integrity of Republic of Indonesia (Republik Indonesia, 1999). In fact, the
implementation of regional autonomy and fiscal decentralization in Indonesia according to Haboddin and
Rahman (2013) after 14 years of implementation has arisen many problems in local governments (LGs), one
of which is the occurrence of decentralization of corruption. According to Deputy for Internal Supervision and
Complaints of
19Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Corruption Eradication Commission;
KPK), that in mid-2016
31This Journal is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License
there were 343 regents/mayors and 18 governors caught in corruption (Firmansyah, 2016). Therefore, there
has been a phenomenon gap between expectations and realization of the
10implementation of fiscal decentralization in Indonesia. Empirical studies of
the influence of fiscal decentralization
on corruption that have been carried out have various evidence. Research that provides evidence that fiscal
decentralization will reduce the incidence of corruption were carried out by Fisman and Gatti (2002a), Fan et
al. (2009), Ivanyna and Shah (2010), Lessmann and Markwardt (2010), (Goel and Nelson, 2010b), Goel and
Nelson (2011), Dong and Torgler (2013), Albornoz and Cabrales (2013), Gurgur and Shah (2014). In the
other hand, the research that provides evidence that fiscal decentralization will increase the incidence of
corruption were carried out by Triesman
13(2000), Fisman and Gatti (2002b), Rinaldi et al. (2007), Lessmann and
Markwardt (2010), Goel and Nelson (2011), Suprayitno (2011), Saputra (2012), Albornoz and Cabrales
(2013). Other empirical research proves that fiscal decentralization does not affect corruption, such as the
results of research carried out by Lecuna (2012),Hartanto and Probohudono (2013), (Gurgur and Shah,
2014).Based on those findings, it turns out that the influence of fiscal decentralization on corruption has
varied results (positive, negative, and not influential) so that it is suspected that there are other factors that
may influence the relationship. Baron and Kenny (1986) state that if the relationship between dependent and
independent variables is weak or inconsistent, then there may be a moderator variable that affects the
relationship. This research offers an approach to fill out the phenomenon of gap and research gap, which is
to re
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30-examine the relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption
and to make natural resources as a moderating variable of the relationship between fiscal decentralization
and corruption. Another new thing from this research is to synthesize the measurement of fiscal
decentralization from previous studies that are adjusted to the fiscal decentralization regulations that apply in
Indonesia. The results of this study show evidence that the incidence of corruption is increasing along with
fiscal decentralization implementation. The second finding of this study is that natural resources will
strengthen the occurrence of corruption when regional governments of district or city implement a system of
7regional autonomy and fiscal decentralization. This study contributes to the
application of
agency theory to the public sector, especially to regional governments that apply the fiscal decentralization
system in managing regional finances. The results of this study can be used by the executive and legislative
at both the central and regional levels to evaluate the weaknesses of the regulation and application of state
financial management and management of mining business permits and forest use because it is empirically
proven in increasing the incidence of corruption in LGs. This paper consists of six parts. The second section
provides a review of the literature and the development of hypotheses. The third section explains the
research methodology, the fourth section presents the results of the research and then discusses it, and the
fifth section contains conclusions. The last section is about the limitations of the research and the future
research.
102. LITERATURE REVIEW 2.1. The Influence of Fiscal Decentralization
on Corruption District and city of regional governments have become the right level for decentralization
where delegation of power and resources will be submitted (Kuncoro, 2014). In terms of the agency theory
framework, the regional government of district or city is essentially a nexus for a series of contractual
relationships between individuals (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The contractual relationship becomes a
reference for the behavior of the actors involved in the agency relationship. In the government sector,
legislation and derivative regulations related to fiscal decentralization, implicitly or explicitly are a form of
contract between principal and agent (Halim and Abdullah, 2006). The regional head and officials of the
regional apparatus as executives act as agents are obliged to submit and obey to follow certain regulations
in carrying out the functions of government.
17Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (The regional people’s representative
assembly;
DPRD) acts as a principal which representing the people, will be guided by these regulations in assessing,
evaluating and supervising the implementation of contracts by agents. If both parties in the agency
relationship maximizing the utility, then there are strong reasons
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11to believe that agents will not always act in the best interests of the
principal
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Halim and Abdullah (2006) stated that theorists hold to the proposition that
agents behave opportunistically toward the principals; the attitude of agent opportunism occurs because of
information asymmetry. Executives have more information because they are bureaucratic and government
administration actors. These are the ones who determine policy choices and priorities in the development of
a region through a Kebijakan Umum Anggaran (General Budget Policy; KUA) as well as Prioritas dan Plafon
Anggaran (Regional Priorities and Ceiling; PPA) which form the basis for the drafting of the Rencana
Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah (Regional Budget and Expenditure Plan; RAPBD) (Republik
Indonesia, 2004). (Halim and Abdullah, 2006)provides an example of opportunistic behavior in proposing
and determining Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah (Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget;
APBD) for executives is proposing activities that are not become a priority, proposing lucrative opportunities
(opportunities to get big personal benefits), enlarge the budget for activities that are difficult to measure the
results, allocate unimportant expenditure components in an activity. These examples are agent opportunism
behavior, hereinafter referred to as corruption behavior. This behavior is also supported by the political
system in Indonesia, because in the regional head elections there is a very high political cost to become a
regional head (regent and mayor), so a large cost recovery is needed. Prud’home (1995) argues that
corruption will increase with decentralization for a number of reasons, i.e., The
22influence of interest groups at the local level, wider discretion
of government employees, and the length of time these employees occupy their positions in one place
making them easier in build unethical relationships. Some researchers who argue that fiscal decentralization
will increase the incidence of corruption are i.e. Triesman
13(2000), Fisman and Gatti (2002b), Rinaldi et al. (2007), Lessmann and
Markwardt (2010), Goel and Nelson (2011), Suprayitno (2011), Saputra (2012), Albornoz and Cabrales
(2013). Based on the study of agency theory, and research findings regarding
22the effect of decentralization on corruption, the following
hypothesis can be derived as: Hypothesis 1: Fiscal decentralization has a positive effect on the incidence of
corruption in regional governments of district and city in Indonesia. 2.2. The Role of Natural Resources
13on the Relationship between Fiscal Decentralization and Corruption
Indonesia is a country which rich in natural resources, especially minerals, coals and forests. Various efforts
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have been made to utilize the wealth of natural resources through mining and forest utilization. Mining
business according to Law No. 4 of 2009 is an activity of
18mineral or coal cultivation which includes stages of general investigation,
exploration, feasibility studies, construction, mining, processing and
refining, transportation and sales, and post-mining activities
(Republik Indonesia, 2009). Forest utilization is an activity to utilize forest areas,
21utilize environmental services, utilize timber and non-timber forest
products and collect timber and non-timber forest products
optimally and fairly for the welfare of the community while maintaining their sustainability (Republik
Indonesia, 2007). Mining business activities and forest utilization in Indonesia are subject to the regulations
governing them; therefore they must obtain permission from the authorities. Izin Usaha Pertambangan
(Mining License; IUP) consists of Exploration IUP, Izin Pertambangan Rakyat (Public Mining License; IPR),
and Izin Usaha Pertambangan Khusus (Specific Mining License; IUPK) (Republik Indonesia, 2009).
Licensing of forest utilization business includes Izin
16Usaha Pemanfaatan Kawasan (Area Utilization License; IUPK), Izin Usaha
Pemanfaatan Jasa Lingkungan (License for Utilizing Environmental Services;
IUPJL),
6Izin Usaha Pemanfaatan Hasil Hutan Kayu (License for Timber Forest Product
Utilization; IUPHHK), Izin Usaha Pemanfaatan Hasil Hutan Bukan Kayu
(License of
16Non- Wood Forest Product Utilization; IUPHHBK), Izin Pemungutan Hasil
Hutan Kayu (License
for Collection of
6Timber Forest Products; IPHHK), and Izin Pemanfaatan Hasil Hutan Bukan
Kayu (License for Non -Timber Forest Product Utilization;
IPHHBK) (Republik Indonesia, 2007).
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6In the era of regional autonomy
28(fiscal decentralization) came into force in
Indonesia, the authority to grant mining permits and forest utilization are decentralized to the level of district
or city of regional governments. The authority of the regent or mayor is so large and massive because it is
protected by regulations, both laws and government regulations (Republik Indonesia, 2001; 2002; 2007;
2009).According to Peraturan Pemerintah (Government Regulation; PP) No. 34 of 2002 Article 37, 38, 39,
40 and No. 6 of 2007 articles 60, 61, 63, 64 and 65 forest utilization permits are under the authority of
regents or mayors. According to PP No. 75 of 2001 article 1 that any mining business can be carried out if it
has first obtained a Mining Authority granted by the regent or mayor if the Mining Authority area is located in
the Regency or City area and or in the sea area up to 4 nautical miles. According to Law No. 4 of 2009
article 37 that IUP are given by regents or mayors if they are in one regency or city, and in article 67 that IPR
are given by regents or mayors, and in article 74 that IUPK given by the minister. Mining and forest
commodity is spread throughout Indonesia, covering Sumatra, Kalimantan, Java, Sulawesi, Maluku, Bali,
Nusa Tenggara and Irian Jaya (Papua). The abundance of natural resources in Indonesia has become a
magnet for rent seeker, who collaborate with state officials (executives) in the region to conduct collusion
and corruption in natural resources massively. It is already become a common knowledge that the political
cost of regional head elections in Indonesia is very high, even it is logically impossible to be returned by the
normal salary of the regent or mayor during his tenure. Therefore, the cost recovery of political costs will be
acquired from various possible alternatives. One of them is through rent seeking for natural resources. Data
from Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) which conducted investigations and research in six provinces in
Indonesia found potential state losses of up to Rp 200 trillion (Samosir, 2014). Agency theory can be used to
explain rent-seeking behavior of this abundance of natural resources. There is information asymmetry:
agents have more information about actual performance, motivation, and real goals, potentially creating
moral hazard (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, the abundance of natural resources will motivate
regional heads or executives (as agents) to collaborate with actors in the field of natural resources (mining
and forestry) to act opportunistically to maximize their utility (advantages). This behavior of executive
opportunism can be reflected in corrupt behavior in granting permits to corporations in natural resources, the
involvement of agents both directly and indirectly through their families and partners in the natural resource
business. Authority in granting mining business licenses and forest utilization is a discretionary power for
executives. Klitgaard (1998) states that corruption will increase when power monopolies, discretionary
power, and lack of accountability are occur. Aidt (2003) also stated that the emergence of corruption was
due to three things, i.e., discretionary power, economic rent, and weak institutions. The abundance of
natural resources
24can be a curse of economic and social development rather than
blessings, it is the findings that have been very
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24well known in the research literature on natural
resources (Busse and Gröning, 2011). Therefore, natural resource abundance will actually supports
corruption, which then will reduces economic performance. The issue
9of corruption may be quite relevant in the context of abundance of natural
resources, because natural resource exploration is very high rent-
seeking activities that can trigger corrupt behavior (Leite and Weidmann, 1999). The research results of
Busse and Gröning (2011) shows that the higher the export of resources causes the greater corruption for
samples of developed and developing countries. Research conducted by
9Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010) shows that the negative relationship between
resource rent and corruption
index can occur in non-democratic countries, but not in democratic countries. Likewise, Leite and Weidmann
(1999) study found out that capital intensive natural resource industries (Fuel and Ores) tend to produce
higher levels of corruption. The labor intensive natural resource industry (Agriculture and Food) tends to
produce lower levels of corruption. Most of research above is at the cross- country level, but there are also
studies conducted at the country level, for example, in province of China. A research conducted by Zhan
(2015) shows that natural resources have a significant positive effect on increasing corruption in China’s
Province. The results of research findings at both country-level and within countries, real facts in the field
and arguments using agency theory indicate that the abundance of natural resources will play a positive role
in increasing corruption when there is decentralization of authority in decision making. Therefore, this
research hypothesis is stated as follow: Hypothesis 2: Natural resources will increase the incidence of
corruption when the district or city regional governments in Indonesia apply the regional autonomy system
(fiscal decentralization). Based on the literature review and development of hypotheses, an empirical
research model can be made as shown in Figure 1. 3. METHODOLOGY 3.1. Data Samples The population
of this study were 514 regency and city governments throughout Indonesia. Sampling was conducted
purposively (purposive sampling) in the observation period between 2008 and 2014 and obtained a final
sample as many as 433 observations consisting of 299 district governments and 134 cities. Observation
data every year is found to be unbalanced. The data source in this study is a secondary data panel of district
and city regional government financial reports in Indonesia, obtained from the official website of the
Direktorat Jenderal Perimbangan Keuangan Kementrian Keuangan (Directorate Figure 1: Research model
General of Financial Balance of the Ministry of Finance) (www. djpk.kemenkeu.go.id) and the Kementrian
Dalam Negeri (Ministry of Internal Affairs) (www.kemendagri.go.id). Natural resource data is obtained from
the Badan Pusat Statistik (Central Statistics Agency) (www.bps.go.id). Data on corruption are obtained from
a special directory of corruption of Mahkamah Agung (Supreme Court) (www.mahkamahagung.go.id) 3.2.
Technical Analysis and Variable Measurement This research uses partial least squares (PLS) - structural
equation modeling (SEM) technique with WarpPLS 5.0 application. PLS- SEM is uses as an analytical tool
because all the variables in this study are using formative indicators, and the data of all variables are not
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normal. In literarture, there are several ways to measure decentralization, it can be based on income,
expenditure, population, and area. This study synthesizes measurements of decentralization based on
expenditure, population and area that have been carried out by several researchers in several previous
studies(Dong and Torgler, 2013; Fisman and Gatti, 2002a; Goel and Nelson, 2011; Lecuna, 2012;
Lessmann and Markwardt, 2010; Zhang and Zou, 1998; Zulyanto, 2010).Measurements from various
researchers were adjusted based on the regulation of fiscal decentralization
17in Indonesia, namely: Law No. 32 of 2004, Law No. 33 of 2004,
PP No. 55 of 2005, and PP No. 58 of 2005. Modified fiscal decentralization formulas are: 1). FDORI;
Expenditures - Dana Alokasi Khusus (Special Allocation Fund; DAK) of District or City of regional
government. 2) FDPOP; Expenditures - DAK of District or City governments divided by the population of
Regency or City governance. 3). FDAREA; Expenditures - DAK District or City of regional governments are
divided by area within a square kilometres (km2) of a Regency or City of regional government. Corruption
(CORP) is defined in
29Law No. 31 of 1999 juncto Law No. 20 of 2001 concerning Eradication of
Corruption in
Articles 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12. An act of corruption covers 30 forms of corruption according to the
articles relating to:
51. State Finance Losses, 2. Bribery, 3. Evasion in office, 4. Extortion, 5.
Deception, 6. Conflict of Interest in Procurement,
7. Gratification. The measurement of corruption follows real measurements made by Fisman and Gatti
(2002b); Liu and Lin (2012); Rini and Damiyati (2017). Natural resources (Gross Regional Domestic Product
of Natural Resources; GRDP-NR) in this study are measured by the total value of Produk Domestik
Regional Bruto (agricultural sector, forestry and fisheries sector, and mining and quarrying sector) of a
Regency or City. This measurement of natural resources follows Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010); Dong
and Torgler (2013); Zhan (2015). The
5control variable in this study is the LG measured by a
dummy variable which are district = 1 and city = 0 and the area (AREA) is measured in a square kilometer of
a district or city government. 4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 4.1. Data Discription Tabel 1 shows the descriptive
statistics. Based on Table 1, it can be seen some descriptive statistical data which includes corruption, fiscal
decentralization, Gross Regional Domestic Product-Natural Resources (in Rupiah), population, and area (in
Km2) to district and city of regional governments in Indonesia. The maximum value of corruption (CORP)
that occurred was Rp532,503,704,250; minimum value of Rp2,300,000; in average Rp8,942,290,548; and
with a standard deviation of Rp42,112,523,646. Fiscal decentralization original (FD-ORI) with a maximum
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value of Rp5,687,523,797,054; minimum value of Rp 279,930,950,341; average value of
Rp1,109,861,531,276; and with a standard deviation of Rp761,198,482,530. Fiscal decentralization per area
(FDAREA) with the maximum value is Rp65,414,649,313; minimum value of Rp20,469,431; average value
of Rp3,379,119,332; and with a standard deviation value of Rp6,519,373,245. Fiscal decentralization per
population (FDPOP) with a maximum value of Rp30,036,673; minimum value of Rp652,767; average value
of Rp 2,409,281; and with a standard deviation value of Rp2,613,913. Gross Regional Domestic Product-
Natural Resources (GRDP-NR) has a maximum value of Rp136,968,580,000,000; minimum value of
Rp38,540,000,000; the average value is Rp4,642,163,556,582; and with a standard deviation value of
Rp11,699,394,343,862. The maximum population is 3,757,864 people; minimum population is 30,147
people; an average of 742,215 people; and a standard deviation of 709,508 people. Maximum area of
44,071 Km²; minimum 16 Km²; an average of 2,729 Km²; and a standard deviation of 5,028 Km². 4.2. The
Results of PLS-SEM Analysis According to Latan and Ghozali (2016) in SEM-PLS analysis there are six
stages, i.e. conceptualization of the model, determining the method of analysis algorithm for the outer model
and inner model, determining the resampling method, drawing a path diagram of the model to be estimated,
evaluating the measurement model
25(measurement model or outer model) and structural model
Table 1: Descriptive statistics Variables Corruption (CORP) Fiscal decentralization original (FD-ORI) Fiscal
decentralization per area (FDAREA) Fiscal decentralization per population (FDPOP) Gross regional
domestic product product-natural resources (GRDP-NR) Population Area evaluation
25(structural model or inner model), and report the results of
the analysis. In the stage of conceptualization of the model, the variables of this study are: corruption, fiscal
decentralization, and natural resource; all using observed variables and variable indicators, in this study
using formative indicators. In the stage of determining the algorithm analysis method, this study uses the
PLS regression option for the outer model algorithm, besides as a default it also has the advantage of being
able to handle the data that has co- linearity problems. Natural resource is a moderating variable so that the
relationship is non-linear; therefore the usage of WARP3 software is the choice of the inner model algorithm.
Stable is an option at the stage of determining the resampling method, because it can generate a standard
error with a small value that is relatively the same as a fair result for small and large samples and with non-
normal conditions (Latan and Ghozali, 2016). The following figure is a path diagram of the research model.
4.3. Evaluation of Measurement Models This study uses all observed variables; a variables which
quantitative values can be measured directly and variable indicators in this study using formative indicators.
According to Joseph et al. (2014) for formative constructs, evaluation of the measurement model can be
seen from the feasibility of the formative indicator by looking at the significance value of weight and co-
linearity (by looking at the VIF value). The result of data processing using WarpPLS shows that weight
significance of all indicators of formative variables <0.05 and co-linearity of all formative indicators shows
VIF value <3.3. Therefore, the significance of weight and the VIF value of all indicators used in this study at
the evaluation stage of the measurement model have fulfilled rule of thumb required (Joseph et al., 2014).
4.4. Evaluation of Structural Models The first stage in structural model evaluation is to evaluate whether a
research model meets the criteria of goodness of fit. There are six fit model indicators used in this study:
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37Average path coefficient (APC), average R-square (ARS) dan average
variance inflation
Maximum 5,3250E+11 5,68752E+12 65414649313 30036672,67 1,36969E+14 3757864 44071 Minimum
2300000 2,799E+11 20469431 652767,38 3,854E+10 30147 16,06 Mean 8942290548 1,10986E+12
3379119332 2409280,587 4,64216E+12 742214,6582 2728,989515 Standard deviation 42112523646
7,61198E+11 6519373245 2613912,771 1,16994E+13 709508,0033 5028,394462
35Table 2: Model fit and quality indices Model fit and quality indices Value
Sign. Rule of thumb Notes
4APC 0. 156 P<0.001 P<0.05 Satisfy Average R-squared (ARS) 0. 128 P<0.001
P<0.05 Satisfy Average adjusted R-squared (AARS) 0. 120 P<0.001 P<0.05
Satisfy Average block VIF (AVIF) 1.
655
5Ideally<3.3 Satisfy Average full collinearity VIF (AFVIF) 1.
981
23Ideally<3.3 Satisfy Tenenhaus GoF (GoF) 0. 326 Small>0.1; medium>0.25;
large>0.36 Medium APC:
Average path coefficient factor (AVIF),
32Average adjusted R-squared (AARS), Average full collinearity VIF (AFVIF),
dan Tenenhaus GoF (GoF).
Kock (2015), The criterion to meet the goodness of fit of the first model is the ρ-valuefor
26APC, ARS and AARS must be significant at
0.05level (ρ-value < 5). The second criterion is that the AVIF and AFVIF value are not more than 3.3 (AVIF
and AFVIF <3.3). The third criterion is the GoF value: small ≥0.1, medium ≥0.25, large ≥0.36. Table 2
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presents the goodness of fit for the research model. In Table 2, it can be seen that all fit models are met,
therefore
26it can be concluded that this researchmodel is fit. The
size of the fit model is: APC = 0.156, ARS = 0.128, and AARS = 0.120; all significant (Ρ < 0.001). AVIF value
= 1.655 and AFVIF value = 1.981, which is lower than 3.3 as the minimum criteria limit, therefore the
research model has no vertical collinearity problem (collinearity between exogenous/predictor variables) and
lateral collinearity (colinearity between exogenous/predictor and endogenous variables/criterion). The criteria
for GoF value = 0.326 means that the predictive power of the model includes the medium category because
the value is > 0.25. The next stage in the structural model evaluation is to look at the R-squared coefficients,
the Q-squared coefficients value, and the effect size for the path coefficients as shown in Table 3.
20In Table 3, it can be seen that the Q-squared value of 0.
203 > 0 indicates that the model has predictive relevance. The coefficient of R-Square determination is
0.128 which indicating that 12.8% variation of endogenous variables (corruption) can be explained by
exogenous variables (fiscal decentralization; FD), moderation of natural resources with fiscal
decentralization (NR*FD), LG and AREA
33while the remaining 87 .2% is explained by other variables outside the
model.
Effect size explains the individual contribution of each exogenous variable to the endogenous variable R-
Squared value. The effect size value of FD at 11.6% means that the absolute value of individual
contributions of fiscal decentralization variables to the R-Squared value of corruption variables includes the
medium from the practical point of view. The effect size value of NR*FD of 1% means that the absolute
value of individual contributions of natural resource moderation Table 3: R-squared coefficients, Q-squared
coefficients, and effect size R-square=0.128 Q-squared=0.203 Effect size Variables Path coefficients
Explanation Rule of thumb FD 0.116 Medium >0.02 NR*FD 0.010 Very weak LG 0.048 Weak weak>0.15
AREA 0.026 Weak medium>0.35 large Table 4: Path coefficients dan P-value variables to the R-Squared
value of corruption variables is very weak from the practical point of view. The last structural model
evaluation is to look at the path coefficients and P-value values. Table 4 is an evaluation of the results of the
structural model measurement: In Table 4, it can be seen that the path coefficient of the fiscal
decentralization variable (FD) is 0.303 and is significant with P < 0.001 and the path coefficient of the
moderating variable which is the interaction of natural resources with fiscal decentralization (NR*FD) is
0.077 and significant with P = 0.035. The path coefficient of the regional government control variable (LG) is
−0.160 and is significant with P < 0.001. The path coefficient of the area control variable (AREA) is 0.086
and is significant with a P = 0.021 5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION Hypothesis 1 stated
7that fiscal decentralization has a positive effect on the corruption of district
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and city regional governments in
Indonesia. Based on WarpPLS output as presented in Figure 2 and Table 4, it is found out that the path
coefficient value FD→CORP is = 0.303 and significant with P < 0.001. Therefore, it can be concluded
7that fiscal decentralization has a positive effect on the corruption of district
and city regional governments in
Indonesia, therefore hypothesis 1 (H1) is accepted. When the hypothesis 1 (H1) is accepted, it means that
the incidence of corruption in district and city of regional governments in Indonesia is increasing along with
fiscal decentralization. The test results of hypothesis 1 in this study are in line with the
14agency theory. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency relations as a
contract whereby one or more parties (principals)
ask another party (agent) to perform particular things for the interests of the principal
14by delegating some decision-making authority to the agent.
Regional governments of District and City are basically a nexus for a series of contractual relations between
agents (executive) and principals (legislative). Regional heads and regional officials are agents who accept
the delegation of decision-making authority from the legislature (the people) to perform several things:
regulate government affairs for the benefit of the people of a Regency or Figure 2: Research result Variables
Path coefficients FD→CORP 0.303 NR*FD→CORP 0.077 LG→CORP −0.160 AREA→CORP 0.086
P-value <0.001 0.035 <0.001 0.021 Rule of thumb P<0.10 P<0.05 P<0.01 Notes Be accepted Be accepted
City according to their
34own initiative based on the aspirations of the people in the Republic of
Indonesia
system. This delegation of authority is carried out based on the contractual relationship agreed upon, which
enacted in the Constitution and the derivatives of the regulations below it up to the regional regulations
concerning the APBD. This authority in the era of fiscal decentralization is very large, and can be seen from
the regulations which governing it, for example
19Law No 32 of 2004, Law No 1 of 2004, Law No 33 of 2005, Law No 17 of 2003,
Government Regulation No
55 and 58 of 2005, and Government Regulation No 71 of 2010. Government affairs which become the
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authority of the Regency and City regional governments include: obligatory affairs; Regency or City-scale
affairs, and optional affairs; governmental
12affairs that actually exist and have the potential to improve the welfare of
the community in accordance with the conditions, peculiarities and superior
potential of the region concerned
(article 11, 14 and 15 of the Law No 32 of 2004). The authority to regulate government affairs and funding
sources provided is realized in the form of Rencana Kerja Pemerintahan Daerah (Regional Government
Work Plans; RKPD) and APBD that are managed in the regional financial management system (article 23 of
Law No 32 of 2004). The regent or mayor as the head of the region with the help of regional government
officials is in control of the management of regional finances. The executive has the authority to organize the
overall management of regional finances (article 156 Law No 32 of 2004 and article 1 of Government
Regulation No 58 of 2005), starting from the entire planning activities to the implementation and reporting
(accountability) stages. The regional head then compiles the draft KUAAPBD (Article 34) and the draft PPAS
is based on the RKPD. Based on the KUA and PPAS that have been discussed and agreed upon with the
DPRD, it is then used to issue Pedoman Penyusunan Rencana Kerja dan Anggaran Satuan Kerja
Perangkat Daerah (Guidelines for the Preparation of Work Plans and Budgets for Regional Device Work
Units; PP RKA-SKPD) by the heads of SKPD (article 35). RKA-SKPD as intended, contains income plans,
expenditures for each program and activity according to the function for the year planned, detailed up to
details of objects of income, expenditure, and financing, and forward estimate for the following year (article
40). The RKA for each SKPD that contains the expenditure plan reflects all programs and activities to carry
out obligatory affairs and optional affairs at the Regency or City of regional government. Therefore, the
Regency or City of regional government has the authority to determine the programs and activities used to
carry out obligatory affairs and optional affairs reflected in the APBD. This is actually the essence of fiscal
decentralization that is applied to District or City of regional governments in Indonesia. Fiscal
decentralization has given greater authority to LGs. Therefore, the power, authority, and responsibility of the
District and City governments are substantive and extensive, and the decentralization policy as described
here will be very radical, resulting in a big bang reform of the government structure (Kuncoro, 2014). This
enormous authority in the era of fiscal decentralization led to the emergence of high discretionary power and
a power monopoly by the executive (regional heads and regional officials). Strom (2000) stated that any
delegation of authority carries the risk
11that the agent does not fully act in accordance with the interests of the
principal.
If the agent has interests and incentives that are not in line with the principal’s interests, the delegation can
cause agency problems which are referred to moral hazard. Experts hold on to propositions that agents
behave opportunistically toward principals. Opportunism means that when cooperation between principals
and agents is established, the principal will encounter loss, because agents prioritize their interests (agent
self-interest) is likely to occur (Halim and Abdullah, 2006). Corruption is an attitude of executive opportunism
caused by information asymmetry, high discretionary power and monopoly of power by regional heads and
officials of regional apparatus caused by enormous authority in regional financial management. The
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corruption in LG in Indonesia continues to
10increase from year to year, both from the number of
cases that occur and the amount of state financial losses and in terms of the quality of criminal acts which
carried out more systematically and in scope that enters all aspects of people’s lives (Suradi, 2014). The
results of this study are in line with a number of previous empirical studies which stated that fiscal
decentralization will increase corruption (Albornoz and Cabrales,
382013; Fisman and Gatti, 2002b; Goel and
Nelson, 2011;
38Lessmann and Markwardt, 2010; Rinaldi et al.,
2007; Saputra, 2012; Suprayitno, 2011; Triesman, 2000). Hypothesis 2 (H2) stated that natural resources
will increase the incidence of corruption when the district or city regional government in Indonesia
implements the regional autonomy system (fiscal decentralization). Based on WarpPLS output as presented
in Figure 2 and Table 4, it can be seen that the path coefficient value is NR*FD→KORP = 0.077 and
significant with P = 0.035. Therefore, hypothesis 2 is accepted and means that natural resources positively
moderate the relationship between fiscal decentralization and the incidence of corruption in the district or city
of regional governments in Indonesia. Indonesia is a country which rich in natural resources. It’s wealth of
minerals, mines, coal and forests extends extensively from the islands of Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan,
Sulawesi and Papua. Before regional autonomy was implemented, the natural resource wealth was utilized
more by the central government since the authority to grant permits was in the central government. Since
regional autonomy and fiscal decentralization began, the authority to grant permits for mining and forest
utilization is decentralized to the district and city governments. The authority of the executive (regent or
mayor and regional officials) in granting the permit is very large because it is protected by regulations, both
by the constitution and government regulations (Republik Indonesia, 2001; 2002; 2007; 2009). This
delegation of authority causes LGs to have high discretionary power. Therefore, in the agency theory
perspective, agency problems will emerge. Executives tend to behave opportunistically by utilizing the
discretionary power they possess by doing collusion and corruption with mining and forestry business
corporations. Corruption will emerge and increase if there is discretionary power (Aidt, 2003; Klitgaard,
1998). ICW which conducted investigations and research in six provinces in Indonesia found that there were
potential state losses of up to 200 trillion Rupiahs (Samosir, 2014). The results of this study support previous
studies, for example: Leite and Weidmann (1999), Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010), Busse and Gröning
(2011), Dong and Torgler (2013), Zhan (2015). These studies have proven that the abundance of natural
resources in the agency theory perspective will encourage agent to act opportunistically by carried out rent-
seeking activities. 6. CONCLUSION This study found two empirical evidences: first; fiscal decentralization
that has been implemented since 2001 in Indonesia until today, has led to an increase in the incidence of
corruption through the budget of the district and city of regional governments, second; abundant natural
resources, especially forests, minerals and coal encourage mining and forestry business corporations to
perform collusion and corruption with regional heads and regional officials who have the authority to grant
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permits. The authority to grant this permit is because the regency and city governments apply the regional
autonomy system and fiscal decentralization. Therefore, natural resources that should be a blessing for the
prosperity of the community turned out to be a disaster for LGs in Indonesia. The
8results of this study support the implementation of agency theory in the
government sector. District and
City of regional governments is the nexus for a series of contractual relations between the executive as an
agent with the legislature and the community as principals. Regulations relating to fiscal decentralization
constitute a contract agreed between the agent and the principal. Information asymmetry cannot be avoided
in any agency relationship; therefore executives tend to do moral hazard. The attitude of executive
opportunism in the form of corruption is a reflection of moral hazard. Corruption is mostly carried out by
regional heads and regional officials because they have authority in managing state finances ranging from
planning, implementation, to accountability and authority in granting mining and forest utilization permits.
The low deternination coefficient (around 13%) reflects the relatively small variability of the effect of
exogenous variables on endogenous variables, therefore most of the influence of exogenous variables is
explained by factors outside the research model. Therefore, in future studies, other factors that influence
corruption such as political factors (e.g., the party who wins regional head elections, legislative elections,
Indonesia’s democracy index), institutional control factors (e.g., the supreme audit institution), LG
characteristics (e.g., number of assets, total population), human resources (e.g., human development index)
and other factors. The use of the size of fiscal decentralization in this study is based on the synthesis of
various measurements of decentralization of previous studies that are adapted to the applicable regulations
in Indonesia, so that the strength of measuring fiscal decentralization in this study has not been tested in
other studies. In future studies it can be applied the synthesis of the results of the measurement of fiscal
decentralization in this study to other countries with adjustments to the regulations within in the country.
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